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Strategic Defence Review & the Emerging Threats


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Concur with Rafi sb here - Those who think India is some "Holy Cow" and one who had sat idle all those 63 years and in point of fact, the past couple of centuries with the Hindutava ideology and dreams of Akhand Bharat need to revisit there thoughts again and research a bit more on their future plans.

Whole Divisions and Battle groups of Army, Airforce and Navy allotted against Pakistan waiting for the right opportunity to take a piece of our land is not a superstition folks.

Substantial amounts of raw data regarding Indian hand in Terrorism past 10 years is just an illusion - a fact to be brushed aside. Ok! What if we begin to think ourselves a friend of India? Would that be reciprocated by India, any sufficient appropriate evidence to suggest India will have peaceful, non-aggressive and dignified intentions and acts?

This is shire due to the resilience of Pakistan Military and each and every Pakistani of our nation to defend such fate blows time and again, in particular after 9/11 by the Indian. Unfortunately, FAILED in its Asian hegemonic designs and suppressing Pakistan as yet.

The posts should be airlifted to relevant threads likely "Strategic Defence Review" thread.

(Rafi are you a Punjabi jatt? just curious to know and if you are comfortable with the disclose)

Punjabi <affirmative> Jatt <roger that>

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when people here say that we have lots of commonalities with india, that sort of talk is not based on facts. The fact is that except for the Muslims ruling over hindus we have nothing in common. IF u read objective history u will find out that before the Muslim invasions the dravidians (70% of present day india) were running around naked and even the women folk were running around bare chested. Their state was exactly like the aus aborigines (who too incedently are dravidians).

Coming to present day Pakistan, 90% of the people/tribes who inhabit Pakistan are not "people of the land" meaning that they over a period of time have invaded/settled here. Great majority of which came here after the inception of Islam.

So that is the main reason why we look to the west more than we look to the east.

Coming to people to people contacts i doubt any one has any problem any one from any part of the world eg i lived in a jewish neighborhood with lots of isrealis and got along smashingly with them, i went to school with indians/americans and got along just fine. similarly the average german got along fine with the average european and the avg. american before ww1/ww2, but that did not stop either ww1 or ww2.

But u see that does not mean any thing as the policy of the state has very little (if at all) to do with the individual, even though the state should be accountable to the individual (in a perfect world). So we need to be mindful of this small but very important aspect.

Indian state policy since 1947 has been to undermine the state of Pakistan in every way possible so as to dismantle the state of Pakistan and the eventual return into the fold of india. All this stems from the fact that they have never truly recognized Pakistan. All their activities since 9/11 in afghanistan have been directed against Pakistan. from running terrorist camps to building 10-12 damns on the river kabul. every thing that the state of india does is anti-Pak.

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Posted (edited) · Report post

They are more Muslims in India than Pakistan's whole population .

I can't believe that even Pakistanis swallow this propaganda, designed to directly attack the reason for Pakistan's existence. What this thought essentially says is: "look, there really was no reason to create Pakistan, even the majority of muslims did not want it and stayed with independent Bharat." Apart from the fact that the propaganda is totally false (14.5% of a billion, is not greater than 97% of 180 million), don't forget the muslims of Bengal who voted for Pakistan, thus the vast majority of muslims of British India did not subscribe to the "Indian identity" created by foreign European colonists.

From Pakistan's side the differences with Bharat are not ideological. Pakistan does not have a problem with Bharat's existence, or its identity and society, or the values and mores of its people. For Pakistan, it is a struggle to survive; but this should not be interpreted as Bharat wanting to take over Pakistan entirely (although the fanatics in Bharat do dream of recreating Mahabharat of 3-4,000 years ago). The mainstream strategic Bharati objective is to break up Pakistan into smaller pieces that it can easily dominate, as it has already done in Bangladesh - which should be ample proof to anyone who has doubts about such a Bharati design.

What some people do not realize is that Bharatis plan way ahead into the future, and are not deterred by temporary setbacks. They have already decided and planned for what they want their country to look like in a 100 - 200 years from now, and are working to achieve that vision. It is in keeping with such vision that they have continued to occupy Kashmir, have broken Pakistan in two, keep fomenting separatism in Sindh and Balochistan, undertake all sorts of terrorism and sabotage in Pakistan, internatinally campaign to isolate Pakistan, etc.

Compromises by Pakistan just allows Bharat to become more intransigent. Case in point: Kashmir. Pursuant to formula for independence of Pakistan and Bharat from British India, Kashmir should have devolved to the sovereignty of Pakistan. However Pakistan compromised, and signed the standstill agreement with the maharajah allowing Bharat to occupy most of Kashmir on the flimsiest of excuse. Pakistan again compromised, and accepted plebiscite under UN auspices while Bharat back tracked, and no plebscite has been held nor is there any likelihood in the future. Pakistan yet again compromised due to its inaction, and de facto accepted the status quo on the line of control, resulting in Bharati occupation of Siachin Glacier. In short, ever since Pakistan's independence Bharat has been nibbling away at it, with the ultimate objective of removing Pakistan from the map in one way or another.

You can only make peace with people who want to make peace with you, not with those who are working to destroy you. If Bharat wants peace with Pakistan, then it has to demonstrate this intention with some concrete action. Have they ever made such a demonstration? Not to the best of my knowledge. The actions Bharat needs to take before Pakistan can trust its peaceful itntentions are essentially as follows (although the final form can be negotiated):

1. Get out of Kashmir;

2. Give up its nuclear weapons, and weapon making capability (Pakistan should do the same, provided Bharat does #3 below); and

3. Reduce its military to a size that cannot overwhelm Pakistan.

If Bharat is willing to do all of the above, only then should Pakistan trust them enough to make peace. Alternatively, you can swallow their propaganda and write your own death warrant.

NavBaby.

Edited by Abbas

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Posted · Report post

I can't believe that even Pakistanis swallow this propaganda, designed to directly attack the reason for Pakistan's existence. What this thought essentially says is: "look, there really was no reason to create Pakistan, even the majority of muslims did not want it and stayed with independent Bharat." Apart from the fact that the propaganda is totally false (14.5% of a billion, is not greater than 97% of 180 million), don't forget the muslims of Bengal who voted for Pakistan, thus the vast majority of muslims of British India did not subscribe to the "Indian identity" created by foreign European colonists.

From Pakistan's side the differences with Bharat are not ideological. Pakistan does not have a problem with Bharat's existence, or its identity and society, or the values and mores of its people. For Pakistan, it is a struggle to survive; but this should not be interpreted as Bharat wanting to take over Pakistan entirely (although the fanatics in Bharat do dream of recreating Mahabharat of 3-4,000 years ago). The mainstream strategic Bharati objective is to break up Pakistan into smaller pieces that it can easily dominate, as it has already done in Bangladesh - which should be ample proof to anyone who has doubts about such a Bharati design.

What some people do not realize is that Bharatis plan way ahead into the future, and are not deterred by temporary setbacks. They have already decided and planned for what they want their country to look like in a 100 - 200 years from now, and are working to achieve that vision. It is in keeping with such vision that they have continued to occupy Kashmir, have broken Pakistan in two, keep fomenting separatism in Sindh and Balochistan, undertake all sorts of terrorism and sabotage in Pakistan, internatinally campaign to isolate Pakistan, etc.

Compromises by Pakistan just allows Bharat to become more intransigent. Case in point: Kashmir. Pursuant to formula for independence of Pakistan and Bharat from British India, Kashmir should have devolved to the sovereignty of Pakistan. However Pakistan compromised, and signed the standstill agreement with the maharajah allowing Bharat to occupy most of Kashmir on the flimsiest of excuse. Pakistan again compromised, and accepted plebiscite under UN auspices while Bharat back tracked, and no plebscite has been held nor is there any likelihood in the future. Pakistan yet again compromised due to its inaction, and de facto accepted the status quo on the line of control, resulting in Bharati occupation of Siachin Glacier. In short, ever since Pakistan's independence Bharat has been nibbling away at it, with the ultimate objective of removing Pakistan from the map in one way or another.

You can only make peace with people who want to make peace with you, not with those who are working to destroy you. If Bharat wants peace with Pakistan, then it has to demonstrate this intention with some concrete action. Have they ever made such a demonstration? Not to the best of my knowledge. The actions Bharat needs to take before Pakistan can trust its peaceful itntentions are essentially as follows (although the final form can be negotiated):

1. Get out of Kashmir;

2. Give up its nuclear weapons, and weapon making capability (Pakistan should do the same, provided Bharat does #3 below); and

3. Reduce its military to a size that cannot overwhelm Pakistan.

If Bharat is willing to do all of the above, only then should Pakistan trust them enough to make peace. Alternatively, you can swallow their propaganda and write your own death warrant.

NavBaby.

AOA;

You just nailed it!!

Imran

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Posted · Report post

What Zain meant was, i think, just about the priority at this very moment. We indeed are in a state of War and it is within. There is no doubt about the external threats and we wont be surprised if the internal threats were partially planned against us likewise. But the war priority at this point is within.

He believes that the Army may finally have started realizing the priority. I certainly hope so.

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Posted · Report post

What Zain meant was, i think, just about the priority at this very moment. We indeed are in a state of War and it is within. There is no doubt about the external threats and we wont be surprised if the internal threats were partially planned against us likewise. But the war priority at this point is within.

He believes that the Army may finally have started realizing the priority. I certainly hope so.

IH, your comparing the capability of takfiris who only possess the ability to murder and kill, to a nuclear armed country who's reason for being is destroying our country. The Armed Forces has never been as ready for COIN and FIBUA as it is now. And more training and capability is on the way.

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Posted · Report post

U r quite right Rafi sahib. I certainly hope so that we are well prepared for any mischief from the east. I am confident.

I was just clearifying Zain's position on the preeminent threat from within.

Although u r 100% on the spot, but i wont underestimate the destructive capability of the "takfiris".

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I also concur with Rafi sahib! People who keep talking about peace keep forgetting that Pakistan during Musharraf, tried everything in the book to make peace.

A Khan,

I'm surprised you think so. My reading is at complete odds with that. While the Indian leadership wasn't as enthusiastic in their interactions with the media as their Pakistani counterparts, all evidence suggests that they welcomed Musharraf's proposals both in spirit and substance. And that fact has been substantiating by none other than General Musharraf in interviews after he stepped down as President.

Support for infiltration into IoK stopped completely, a major demand of India, who would only talk after that. Guess what Infiltration stopped, India didnt want to talk. They didnt even bother shifting some of their troops out of heavily populated urban areas, which was the one and only key demand from Pakistan.

Demilitarization is phased process and unfortunately the Indian authorities have a tendency of moving slowly and cautiously. That said, the army was moved out of the cities and replaced with paramilitary forces in 2006-07 IIRC. Over the last three or four years the paramilitary forces have also been drawn down. By 2015, all the cities will have been demilitarized and turned over to the Jammu and Kashmir Police with the possible exception of Leh.

India wont budge even an inch on any issue, Siachen, Sir Creek, you name it, Pakistan was flexible on every issue but India wasnt.

India-Pak were close to an agreement on Kashmir: Musharraf

India and Pakistan were tantalisingly close to an agreement on Kashmir and other contentious issues between the two countries when President President Pervez Musharraf was in power.

In an interview to Karan Thapar's Devil's Advocate programme, Musharraf, when asked if the two countries were close to an agreement that was path-breaking, said, "Yes, absolutely. On all three issues-- Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek".

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indiapak-were-close-to-an-agreement-on-kash/490752/

This would obviously have been possible only with an active participation on the Indian side.

Who has forgotten Baglihar Dam issue? India asked Pakistan to back down from internationalising the issue, Pakistan obliged and India went on and built it anyway according to their initial plans. No compromise what so ever. I have first hand seen its effect on river Chenab as it enters Pakistan from IoK. They've turned the mighty river into a stream during most of the year. Now they are trying a similar stunt on river Jhelum and their nefarious designs are also working over time on the Indus.

The Baglihar Dam issue was sorted out by an independent body after talks reached a deadlock in 2005 and India agreed to abide by the arbitrator's rulings. Regarding the flow in the Chenab river - the Baglihar dam is a run-of-the-river project, the only time the flow of water was affected was during the initial pondage filling. It doesn't have a reservoir for distribution, so the volume of water flowing towards the dam equals the volume flowing out and into Pakistan.

Edited by Vivek

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Posted · Report post

I do not hate indians as individuals - but the indian state is a wholly different kettle of fish - it's security forces Raison d'être is the destruction and subjugation of the Pakistani people and state, I have seen their plans for this, they frequently war game for cutting our country in half. They have never been and never will be our friends.

We can deter them by being strong - and that will be the only guarantee for peace.

Its important to draw a distinction between the Indian security forces and the Indian state. While their opinion may be sought on issues that directly concern them, the military is completely subservient to the political authorities. War games are carried out to hone its own proficiency, but the decision to go to war will be taken only by government.

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I absolutely concur with all members who have stated that peace cannot be achieved with a state that since its inception has worked towards the destruction of Pakistan. Peace with India is an illusion. New Delhi often likes to protray itself as having moved on from being a regional player to being a global player but everything about Indian foreign and security policies reinforces the fact that India still yearns for regional hegemony subduing all states to its writ. The only thing in it's way is Pakistan and everything its founding fathers wanted Pakistan to stand for. Peace with India can only be sought on our terms and New Delhi's adventurism into Kashmir, Siachen and its use of proxies in Balouchistan and the North West will be paid in kind following US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

India can maintain a false sense of security with Cold Start but far fetched military strategies based on a gross underestimation of the adversery coupled with a delusional sense of ones own grandoise is only going to teach them the hard way of true limits in their power.

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Vivek

Yes Kashmir could have been resolved but it wasn't. It was well documented that Pakistan under Musharraf was willing talk about all issues with no pre conditions or exceptions. India on the other hand had a completely different attitude which is why the talks failed.

If India is serious about peace then their threat perceptions would not be so warped and instead of militarising the region they would engage smaller states in constructive inter regional dialogue.

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Posted (edited) · Report post

It's not a case of being an "indian lover" or an "indian hater" which clearly you can't seem to look beyond, but it's a case of threat perception. Of course the indian military is a threat, but right now they don't really need to do much. It's quite sad really, you claim to have some clairvoiant knowledge of indian designs, yet are absolutely clueless when it comes to a bunch of nutcases making the army look like clowns. Simply spewing hatred won't change things, but I guess if this is an "eternal" conflict, perhaps they won't.

Buraq,

You are naive. There is a certain theme in all your postings which I find very interesting.

Edited by Boota

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U r quite right Rafi sahib. I certainly hope so that we are well prepared for any mischief from the east. I am confident.

I was just clearifying Zain's position on the preeminent threat from within.

Although u r 100% on the spot, but i wont underestimate the destructive capability of the "takfiris".

My brother - there is a clear and present danger and also a long term strategic threat, also the takfiri threat has more than one dimension, for example military power alone cannot defeat an insurgency based on ideas and the wrong headed interpretation of religion. There is requirement for controlling religious preachers and madrassa reform, police and law enforcement, judicial reforms, any number of steps alongside the military.

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Buraq,

You are naive. There is a certain theme in all your postings which I find very interesting.

Yes there is a certain "signature" to his posts, isn't there.

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Members might recall that we had an exhange on the forum a few years ago where we reached a conclusion that Pakistan will face an external war threat or even a real war situation around 2011/12. I think that perception is coming close to reality.

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God there are naive people in this country, peace with India yeh right, just like the Isreal's have done with the Palestinians strung them along for 20 years.

I don't agree with this trade with India is beneficial crap, we will have cheap 2nd rate goods flooding our market and destroying local manufacturing. If we have not been able to capitalize on our relationship with the ME, Turkey and China do you really thing India is a silver lining?

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Vivek,

I wont go into every single issue mentioned, since you can read about from articles already posted on this forum. But read the article below on Siachen as one example where India repeatedly refuses to move even an inch to seek peace. Being the bigger neighbour, even showing some will to peace could create a mountain of goodwill. Stubberness and war hysteria will have the exact opposite effect. Your indian government/state wants Pakistan to compromise on every single issue first before they will even consider reciprocate, using the convenient "babu's are too cautious what can we do" excuses for the last 65 years. Arent the politicians their bosses? Its funny that in the worlds largest "democracy", the PM and government cant make the babu´s and army accept their deals on Siachen. You probably have a convenient excuse for that also.

WikiLeaks: Indian army poses as obstacle to Siachen solution

There has been repeated failure to reach a solution on the Siachen dispute due to the Indian army’s resistance to giving up its territory under any condition, according to latest cables released by Wikileaks.

According to the 2006 cable classified by the Deputy Chief of Mission Geoff Pyatt, the reasons for the Indian army’s resistance are its strategic advantage over China, internal army corruption, distrust of Pakistan and a desire to keep hold of advantageous territory that thousands of Indian soldiers have died protecting.

The cable stated that every time India and Pakistan came “very close” to an agreement on the Siachen issue, the prime minister of the day would be forced to back out by the Indian defence establishment, the Congress Party hardline and opposition leaders.

FULL ARTICLE: http://tribune.com.pk/story/180770/wikileaks-indian-army-poses-as-obstacle-to-siachen-solution/

Just for your information, on the Pakistani side, Musharraf's peace initiatives had the implicit/explicit support of all major Pakistani political parties including PPP, PML-Q + PML-N and most smaller parties nationalist and regional parties excluding the extreme right wing JI, JUI-F/S, etc.

Has there EVER been such cross-party support in India on the issue of peace with Pakistan? Never! Vajpayee didnt even have support of his own cabinet and similar with Manmohan. The PM says one small thing in favor of peace, and almost immediately other ministers are ready with hardline statements to re-assure the war hawks and the indian media that the PM did mean it.

Edited by A Khan

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Posted (edited) · Report post

God there are naive people in this country, peace with India yeh right, just like the Isreal's have done with the Palestinians strung them along for 20 years.

I don't agree with this trade with India is beneficial crap, we will have cheap 2nd rate goods flooding our market and destroying local manufacturing. If we have not been able to capitalize on our relationship with the ME, Turkey and China do you really thing India is a silver lining?

The peaceniks hearts are in the right place, but they are naive - more than 80% of the entity to the east's army, navy, air force, are orientated towards Pakistan, that is why you know when some indians come and say, we are building up, because we fear the PRC (a blatant lie) - then why the strategic orientation towards us. What the problem is, some people think that because we have this "realistic" view about the indian's we somehow hate all indians. This is a complete fallacy, in fact - indian females have been the best people that have ever worked for us, reliable - brave - totally trustworthy once they committed to the cause. In fact we helped one gal get the citizenship of a unnamed western country and set her up, after she had been compromised.

So the average indian has never been, and never will be our enemy - it is the state and it's institutions that wish to harm - our nation that are our eternal enemy, in point of fact, these same institutions are working to undermine - poor people in up to a third of india fighting for their rights, and the other oppressed minorities.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13624077

Edited by Rafi

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Vivek

Yes Kashmir could have been resolved but it wasn't. It was well documented that Pakistan under Musharraf was willing talk about all issues with no pre conditions or exceptions. India on the other hand had a completely different attitude which is why the talks failed.

I don't think the talks failed. The problem as I see it was that Musharraf lost power. The talks thereafter stagnated despite an eager President Zardari, because the Indian leadership doubted his ability to deliver on promises, especially given the fact that the military and intelligence services seemed to be leery of his authority. And of course they completely broke down after the Mumbai incident.

Point is that the willingness to make concessions was in very evident on both sides back in 2007 and I'm convinced that had Musharraf continued in power, we'd have been well on way to a new era in bilateral relations. India was willing to devolve authority to Kashmir and demilitarize the region and Pakistan was willing to give up its insistence on a plebiscite and include the region administered by it into the negotiations. Despite the current chill in relations, the basis for a future resolution on Kashmir as well as other issues was created by Musharraf and Manmohan Singh. Five years from now when ties are warmer and hopefully Pakistan isn't preoccupied with domestic problems, the same proposals will be dusted off and the process will resume from where it was left in 2007.

If India is serious about peace then their threat perceptions would not be so warped and instead of militarising the region they would engage smaller states in constructive inter regional dialogue.

India's military spending has remained more or less steady as a percentage of the national budget. And the modernization seems to be mostly China specific. China's military modernization on the other hand is taking place with a close eye on the US. Ideally speaking all four countries should be looking at better uses for money otherwise invested in defence. In any event, I don't see that halting regardless of the state of Indo-Pak relations.

With regard to other regional states; they are being engaged in dialogue - foreign relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar are in the best state they've been in the last two decades.

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To understand Indian State, the mindset and intend has to be scrutinized - the duplicitous policy. Quite a read as most, if not all can be matched with current Hindutva Indian ideology in place, to sum-up the Indian Government's imbroglio in clarity - most Kautilyan principles are copied from here and there, requires a patient read. How can you face and defeat that?

Indian Foreign Policy and War based on 'Kautilyan principles'

Abstract: Kautilya was the key adviser to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya (c. 317-293 B.C.E.). Written about 300 B.C.E., Kautilya's Arthasastra was a science of politics intended to teach a wise king how to govern. In this work, Kautilya offers wide-ranging and truly fascinating discussions on war and diplomacy. Kautilya wanted the expansion of the empire with harsh measures. A number of authors have explored these domestic policies, but very few scholars have focused on Kautilya's discussions of war and diplomacy. And yet, his analyses are fascinating and far-reaching, such as his wish to have his king become a world conqueror, his evaluation of which kingdoms are natural allies and which are inevitable enemies, his willingness to make treaties that he knew he would break, his doctrine of silent war or a war of assassination and contrived revolt against an unsuspecting king, his approval of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them, his view of women as weapons of war, his use of religion and superstition to bolster his troops and demoralize enemy soldiers, his employment of the spread of disinformation, and his humane treatment of conquered soldiers and subjects.

Intro:

Many Indian historians are proud to embrace Kautilya's Arthasastra as a practical book of rugged political realism—instead of the impotent idealism of, say, Plato—that actually shaped history. Kautilya's Arthasastra is thus a book of political realism, a book analyzing how the 'political world' does work and not very often stating how it ought to work, a book that frequently discloses to a king what calculating and sometimes brutal measures he must carry out to preserve the state and the common good.

Kautilya and His "Science of Politics":

R. P. Kangle translates the word arthasastra as "science of politics," (11) a treatise to help a king in "the acquisition and protection of the earth." (12) Others translate arthasastra in slightly different ways: A. L. Basham says it is a "treatise on polity," (13) Kosambi emphasizes the economic importance of the word in calling it a "science of material gain," (14) and G. P. Singh labels it a "science of polity." (15) I happen to prefer to translate arthasastra as a "science of political economy," but however one translates the word, Kautilya claimed to be putting forth what Heinrich Zimmer rightly calls "timeless laws of politics, economy, diplomacy, and war." (16)

Because he was offering his readers a science with which they could master the world, Kautilya believed that having a passive stance toward the world—for example, trusting in fate or relying on superstition—was outlandish. "One trusting in fate," noted Kautilya, "being devoid of human endeavor, perishes."(17) His philosophy called for action, not resignation: "The object slips away from the foolish person, who continuously consults the stars; . . . what will the stars do?" (18) In urging the king to rely on science and not the precepts of religion, Kautilya separated political thought from religious speculation. (19)

Like Thomas Hobbes, Kautilya believed the goal of science was power. His statements "Power is (possession of) strength" and "strength changes the mind" (20) show that Kautilya sought the power to control not only outward behavior, but also the thoughts of one's subjects and enemies. Probably his science could not promise all of that, but the power offered by this science was extensive: "An arrow, discharged by an archer, may kill one person or may not kill (even one); but intellect operated by a wise man would kill even children in the womb." (21) Having as his first and primary goal to "destroy the enemies and protect his own people," (22) the king could certainly accomplish this with Kautilya's science; in fact, "he, who is well-versed in the science of politics . . . plays, as he pleases, with kings tied by the chain of his intellect." (23) Beyond protecting the kingdom, the king who uses Kautilya's science can bring to himself and his subjects the three goods of life—"material gain, spiritual good and pleasures." (24) Wealth is the key to raising successful armies and having a peaceful and just kingdom, and Kautilya's political science brings wealth: "The source of the livelihood of men is wealth, in other words, the earth inhabited by men. The science which is the means of the attainment and protection of that earth is the Science of Politics." (25) Put another way, Kautilya's book is the greatest weapon a king can have, and political science is more important than—or at least brings about—wealth, armies, and conquests.

International politics:

In the world of international politics, it is only "natural" that nations interact with each other through "dissension and force." (26) A political realist typically argues that there will always be conflict in international relations and, in effect, rule by the strongest. Kautilya was writing about 300 B.C.E., a century after Thucydides composed his History of the Peloponnesian War and several decades after the Sophists Callicles and Thrasymachus said to Plato that rule by the stronger was "natural." Kautilya, in the boldest of his promises, claimed that one who knows his science of politics can conquer the world, that "one possessed of personal qualities, though ruling over a small territory . . . conversant with (the science of) politics, does conquer the entire earth, never loses." (27) There is no modesty here. Kautilya's science brings an abundance of wealth and details correct strategies in politics and war. With this science anyone can succeed: "And winning over and purchasing men of energy, those possessed of might, even women, children, lame and blind persons, have conquered the world." (28) Kautilya did not see this conquest as something unjust. A king who carries out his duties, rules according to law, metes out only just punishment, applies the law equally "to his son and his enemy," and protects his subjects not only goes "to heaven" but "would conquer the earth up to its four ends." (29) Whereas Kautilya did not talk of glory, I do believe he was thinking of something we might call "greatness," but this would come only with social justice and the morally correct ordering of the world. The king, "after conquering the world . . . should enjoy it divided into varnas [castes] and asramas [Hindu stages of life] in accordance with his own duty." (30)

What Kautilya apparently meant by the phrase "conquering the world" is something very crucial to understand. Surely Dikshitar is correct in saying that this ideal of a world conqueror in ancient India led to an "imperialism" that was "one of the causes of chronic warfare," (31) although the Mauryan dynasty did bring comparative peace for more than a century. As Narasingha Prosad Sil notes, "For Kautilya a world conquest is the true foundation for world peace." (32)

Diplomacy and Foreign Policy as Extensions of Warfare:

As a political realist, Kautilya assumed that every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest, and therefore moral principles or obligations have little or no force in actions among nations. While it is good to have an ally, the alliance will last only as long as it is in that ally's as well as one's own self-interest, because "an ally looks to the securing of his own interests in the event of simultaneity of calamities and in the event of the growth of the enemy's power." (33) Whether one goes to war or remains at peace depends entirely upon the self-interest of, or advantage to, one's kingdom: "War and peace are considered solely from the point of view of profit." (34) One keeps an ally not because of good will or moral obligation, but because one is strong and can advance one's own self-interest as well as the self-interest of the ally, for "when one has an army, one's ally remains friendly, or (even) the enemy becomes friendly." (35) Because nations always act in their political, economic, and military self-interest, even times of peace have the potential to turn abruptly into times of war, allies into enemies, and even enemies into allies. Burton Stein notes correctly that Kautilya was describing a foreign policy not of a great empire like that of the Mauryas, but of small warring states in incessant conflict, such as India experienced before the Mauryan Empire. (36) Kautilya probably assumed that peaceful empires cannot last forever, and that conflict among smaller states is more common in history. And thus India does not want peace as it follows the idealism of Kautilya.

Kautilya is most famous for outlining the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy, in which immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally, or, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Imagine a series of states to one's west, and then number them starting with oneself. States numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on will likely be friends, whereas states 2, 4, 6, 8, and so on will probably be enemies. (The same thing can be done with concentric circles, which would look more like a mandala, but it is difficult to envision these circles as states.) Kautilya put this basic principle in a number of different ways, but most simply as, "One with immediately proximate territory is the natural enemy." (37) Elsewhere he stated this Mandala theory of foreign policy in more detail: "With respect to the middle king [he himself], the third and the fifth constituents are friendly elements. The second, the fourth, and the sixth are unfriendly elements." (38)

Kautilya assumed that he lived in a world of foreign relations in which one either conquered or suffered conquest. He did not say to himself, "Prepare for war, but hope for peace," but instead, "Prepare for war, and plan to conquer."

Diplomacy was just another weapon used in the prolonged warfare that was always either occurring or being planned for. After analyzing a king's unique configuration of potential enemies and allies, Kautilya then coldly calculated how that king must think and act. "The king, endowed with personal excellences and those of his material constituents, the seat of good policy, is the would-be conqueror. Encircling him on all sides, with territory immediately next to his is the constituent called the enemy. In the same manner, one with territory separated by one (other territory) is the constituent called the ally." (39) This much just repeats the principles of foreign policy discussed above, but then notice how Kautilya regarded neighboring states: "A neighboring prince possessed of the excellences of an enemy is the foe; one in calamity is vulnerable; one without support or with weak support isfit to be exterminated; in the reverse case, fit to be harassed or weakened. These are the different types of enemies." (40)

In his excellent discussion of Kautilya's Mandala theory of foreign policy, Singh continues by correctly stating that this is ancient India's most notable contribution to political theory. (41) Although Singh analyzes Kautilya's theory well, he makes a mistake in labeling the Mandala theory an argument based on the doctrine of the balance of power. Kautilya, in fact, was not offering a modern balance of power argument. In the twentieth century, international relations theorists have defended the doctrine of the balance of power, because equally armed nations will supposedly deter each other, and therefore no war will result. One does find this argument occasionally in Kautilya: "In case the gains [of two allies of equal strength] are equal, there should be peace; if unequal, fight," (42) or, "the conqueror should march if superior in strength, otherwise stay quiet." (43) Whereas these balance of power theorists suggest that a nation arm itself so that it can ensure peace, Kautilya wanted his king to arm the nation in order to find or create a weakness in the enemy and conquer, even to conquer the world.

In reading his Arthasastra, we find no moral considerations other than a king doing what is right for his own people. Rather, we discover merely what Kautilya regarded as the nature of power. The king, he wrote, "should march when by marching he would be able to weaken or exterminate the enemy." (44) And Kautilya assumed that every other state would act in a like manner because "even the equal who has achieved his object tends to be stronger, and when augmented in power, untrustworthy; prosperity tends to change the mind." (45) Just as did Thucydides, Kautilya regarded a request for negotiations as a sign of weakness, indeed a desperate act of a weak nation trying to survive: "A weaker king may bargain with a stronger king with the offer of a gain equal to his troops, when he is in a calamity or is addicted to what is harmful [that is, women, wine, or gambling] or is in trouble. He with whom the bargain is made should fight if capable of doing harm to him; else he should make the pact." (46)

Whereas Carl von Clausewitz said that war is just an extension of domestic politics, (47) Kautilya argued that diplomacy is really a subtle act of war, a series of actions taken to weaken an enemy and gain advantages for oneself, all with an eye toward eventual conquest. A nation's foreign policy should always consist of preliminary movements toward war: "In this way, the conqueror should establish in the rear and in front, a circle (of kings) in his own interest. . . . And in the entire circle, he should ever station envoys and secret agents, becoming a friend of the rivals, maintaining secrecy when striking again and again. The affairs of one, who cannot maintain secrecy . . . undoubtedly, perish, like a broken boat in the ocean." (48) In Kautilya's foreign policy, even during a time of diplomacy and negotiated peace, a king should still be "striking again and again" in secrecy.

Consider some of the measures Kautilya supported during times of peace. If opposed by an alliance of nations, a king should secretly "sow dissensions" within the alliance until one or more of the parties in the alliance becomes weak. (49) When he has weakened a neighbor, the king "should violate the treaty." (50) Or, in another example, "The wise (conqueror), making one neighboring king fight with another neighboring king, should seize the territory of another, cutting off his party on all sides." (51) In Kautilya's view, two kinds of kingdoms confront any king—those weak kingdoms fit to be exterminated and those strong kingdoms that, over a long period of time, one can only secretly harass and hope to weaken. He advised, "As between an enemy fit to be harassed and an enemy fit to be exterminated, acquisition of land from an enemy fit to be exterminated is preferable. For, the king fit to be exterminated, being without support or with a weak support, is deserted by his subjects when, on being attacked, he wishes to flee taking with him the treasury and the army." (52) It is best to attack an enemy that is "disunited," rather than an enemy in which the subjects have organized themselves into "bands." (53) During times of peace and negotiations, Kautilya wanted spies and secret agents to exploit the divisions within a country. Most countries, he maintained, have four kinds of unhappy subjects—the enraged, the frightened, the greedy, and the proud. Secret agents can widen and deepen these divisions by inciting these four types of people to act against their king. The opposing king "should win over the seducible in the enemy's territories by means of conciliation and gifts and those not seducible by means of dissension and force." (54)

Because a king abides by a treaty only for so long as it is advantageous, Kautilya regarded all allies as future conquests when the time is ripe. He wrote, for example, "That ally who remains common to the enemy (and himself), he should divide that rogue from the enemy (and) when divided, exterminate him, thereafter (exterminate) the enemy." (55) Kautilya also sought to take a nation trying to remain neutral or "indifferent" and secretly provoke war between that nation and a neighboring kingdom, until the neutral nation sought his help. Then Kautilya's king could "place him under (his) obligations." (56) Kautilya himself had no moral qualms about breaking obligations or trust: "That ally who might do harm or who, though capable, would not help in times of trouble, he should exterminate him, when trustingly, he comes within his reach."(57)

Because foreign policy is just an extension of a nation's wars, the goal of foreign policy is not to end wars, but rather to ward off defeats and to make sure one is successful in subsequent warfare. For Kautilya, all ambassadors were potential spies with diplomatic immunity. (58) Indeed, he wrote an entire section about how to "fight with the weapon of diplomacy." (59)

War:

Kautilya thought there was a "science" of warfare, presumably part of a larger science of politics. The Commandant of the Army, he suggested, should be "trained in the science of all (kinds of) fights and weapons, (and) renowned for riding on elephants, horses or in chariots." (60) Just as Machiavelli advised his prince to attend to matters of warfare constantly, so did Kautilya advise the king not to leave military matters entirely to others: "Infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants should carry out practice in the arts outside (the city) at sun-rise. . . . The king should constantly attend to that, and should frequently inspect their arts." (61) Just as the king's agents spied on officials in the state bureaucracy, so too must the king have spies to assess the loyalty of soldiers. What greater threat is there to a king than having a military coup remove him from power? Kautilya recommended that "secret agents, prostitutes, artisans and actors as well as elders of the army should ascertain with diligence, the loyalty or disloyalty of soldiers." (62)

In his section on foreign policy, Kautilya wrote a startling sentence: "Of war, there is open war, concealed war and silent war." (63) Open war is obvious, and concealed war is what we call guerrilla warfare, but silent war is a kind of fighting that no other thinker I know of has discussed. Silent war is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king and his ministers—and unknowingly, the people—all act publicly as if they were at peace with the opposing kingdom, but all the while secret agents and spies are assassinating important leaders in the other kingdom, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation. According to Kautilya, "Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is error or a calamity, giving way and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the mark of silent war." (64) In silent warfare, secrecy is paramount, and, from a passage quoted earlier, the king can prevail only by "maintaining secrecy when striking again and again." (65) This entire concept of secret war was apparently original with Kautilya. (66)

Open warfare, Kautilya declared, is "most righteous," (67) but he was willing to use any and all kinds of warfare to achieve consolidation and expansion of the kingdom. There is no question of morality here—other than the general good of one's kingdom—but only of strategy. Kautilya advised the king that "When he is superior in troops, when secret instigations are made (in the enemy's camp), when precautions are taken about the season, (and) when he is on land suitable to himself, he should engage in an open fight. In the reverse case, (he should resort to) concealed fighting." (68) How different all this is from the image of war, certainly exaggerated, found in the Hindu epics, the Mahabharata, or the Ramayana, of the central figure being the great hero in the chariot who frightened all before him. (69)

In Book 12, Kautilya faced the situation in which one rules a weak kingdom and is about to be attacked by a stronger king. He maintained that "there are three kings who attack: the righteous conqueror, the greedy conqueror and the demoniacal conqueror." (70) Whereas one can satisfy a righteous conqueror simply by submitting to his rule, one must surrender "land and goods" as well as money in order to satisfy a greedy conqueror. The demoniacal conqueror, however, will stop only when he has seized "land, goods, sons, wives and life." (71) A weak king must give up everything if it is inevitable, but he must find a way to survive to fight another day, preserving "his body, not wealth; for, what regret can there be for wealth that is impermanent?" (72) However, Kautilya did not advocate giving in to a conqueror without countermeasures and recommended that the king use "diplomatic or concealed warfare"; attempt to conciliate his enemy with gifts; direct secret agents to wield "weapons, poison or fire" to destroy the enemy's fort or camp; instruct secret agents to promote a coup by a "pretender from his family or a prince in disfavor"; send the demoniacal king listless elephants, which had been poisoned; give to the enemy king treasonable or alien troops; surrender to an entirely different king and give him all but the capital city; have secret agents instigate a revolt among the subjects of the enemy king; "employ assassins and poison-givers"; use an astrologer to persuade a "high officer" of the enemy king to try a coup; command secret agents to declare that the Regent of the king is about to take power, while the agents kill leaders at night and blame the murders on the Regent of the enemy king; use secret agents in the countryside to protest oppression of the enemy king's bureaucracy and kill agents of the king hoping to start a revolt; or finally, set fire to palaces and stores of grain and blame this on the Regent of the enemy king.(73)

Kautilya often advocated using women as weapons of war. He certainly regarded women as a source of satisfaction for troops at war, writing that when setting up camp for the army, "courtesans (should be encamped) along the highways." (74) And Kautilya certainly saw women as an addictive source of pleasure, worse than wine or gambling, that a good king must enjoy only in moderation: "Deliverance is possible in gambling, without deliverance is addiction to women. Failure to show himself, aversion from work, absence of material good and loss of spiritual good by allowing the right time to pass, weakness in administration and addiction to drink (result from addiction to women)." (75) Precisely because women are such a powerful addiction, a king can use them against an enemy; for example, if a king is trying to undermine a ruling oligarchy, he "should make chiefs of the ruling council infatuated with women possessed of great beauty and youth. When passion is roused in them, they should start quarrels by creating belief (about their love) in one and by going to another." (76) A woman supposedly in love with one leader should go to another, profess her love for him, urge him to murder the first leader, and "then she should proclaim, 'My lover has been killed by so and so.'" (77) Obviously such tactics create mistrust among leaders of an oligarchy and also bring about the death of key enemies. In the chapters about how a weak king can stave off disastrous conquest by a stronger king, Kautilya again turned, as just one possible tactic among many, to women as weapons of war, stating that "keepers of prostitutes should make the (enemy's) army chiefs infatuated with women possessed of great beauty and youth. When many or two of the chiefs feel passion for one woman, assassins should create quarrels among them." (78) Secret agents can destroy high officers in the enemy army either with poison or with "love-winning medicines." (79)

Speaking of justice to an enemy about to conquer is the last tactic of the weak, just as Thucydides showed in his recreation of the debate about Melos. In Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, the Melians try to talk about justice and fair play when facing the prospect of conquest by the Athenians, who contend that such arguments are the last, desperate tactic of those facing defeat, which the Melians "know as well as we do." The Athenians tell the Melians "that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."(80 After that both the Melians and the Athenians debate only what is in the self-interest of Athens. Similarly, willing to try all tactics, even desperate ones, Kautilya made up a powerful speech to be given by a weak king to the king about to conquer, a speech offering a mixture of moral exhortation and arguments based on the self-interest of the conqueror. In this speech, Kautilya depicted an envoy saying to the conquering king that he should accept a treaty and "pay regard to [his] spiritual and material well-being"; that conquering a kingdom willing to surrender on reasonable terms is an "impious act"; that battle is not in the conquering king's self-interest, since "to fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed" and the conqueror will lose troops and "material good"; that such a conquest will only unite his enemies all the more;that the conquering king's enemies are only waiting for him to be weakened in order to attack; that he himself is risking death; that war itself in which men on each side die is "an impious act"; and that he should not listen to "enemies masquerading as friends" who are giving him false advice as to his real self-interest.(81) In much the same way as Thucydides, only more dramatically, Kautilya demonstrated the realities of diplomacy and war as well as the ineffectiveness of moral pleas when confronted by a superior power.

Machiavelli longed for the legions of ancient Rome; Kautilya wanted legions, but he wanted them preceded by elephants, which acted in the ancient world a bit like modern tanks. So valuable were they that Kautilya wrote, "destruction of an enemy's forces is principally dependent on elephants."(82)As shown earlier, Kautilya considered the treasury most valuable in raising an army, procuring equipment (including elephants),and preparing for war. After the treasury and the army, Kautilya focused on the importance of the fort, on which depends "the treasury, the army, silent war, restraint of one's own party, use of armed forces, receiving allied troops, and warding off enemy troops and forest tribes. And in the absence of a fort, the treasury will fall into the hands of enemies. . . those with forts are not exterminated." (83) (A mountain fort is more valuable than a river fort, because it "is easy to protect, difficult to lay siege to, difficult to climb."(84))

Kautilya was inconsistent in ranking the importance of the treasury, the army, and forts, but it seems that the people, or a popular army, are the most important of all. As he put it, "one should seek a fortress with men." (85) Well before Machiavelli defended a republican army, well before Mao Zedong defended a people's war as invincible, Kautilya urged the king to be popular with the people and rely on the countryside. "If weak in might, [a king] should endeavor to secure the welfare of his subjects. The countryside is the source of all undertakings; from them comes might." (86) The "undertakings" of forts, the treasury, and the army all depend ultimately on the people of the countryside, where are found "bravery, firmness, cleverness and large numbers." (87) Kautilya here was cautiously making a revolution in warfare, relying not quite as much on the warrior class of kshatriyas. India was divided into four castes (varnas): brahmins or priests; kshatriyas or warriors and rulers; vaishyas or farmers and traders; and sh-udras or laborers. TheDharmas-utras, or law codes, writtenbefore Kautilya, urged an army of kshatriyas and, in an emergency, also brahmins (priests) and vaishyas (farmers or merchants). Kautilya had no use for brahmin troops—"by prostration, an enemy may win over Brahmana troops"—but he liked the energy, numbers, and strength of sh-udras, agricultural laborers treated much like serfs. (88) Kautilya's praise of ordinary men from the lower two varnas was unusual in the ancient world. He wrote, "As between land with the support of a fort and one with the support of men, the one with the support of men is preferable. For, a kingdom is that which has men. Without men, like a barren cow, what could it yield?" (89) Says Sharma, "Kautilya alone holds that the army made up of vaishyas and sudras is important." (90) Kautilya apparently believed that an army of kshatriyas was best; warriors were supposed to find their "highest duty and pleasure" by dying in battle. (91) Megasthenes, a Greek ambassador to Chandragupta Maurya's court, suggested that as much as one-fifth of the population under Chandragupta's empire were warriors or kshatriyas. (92) In addition, Kautilya clearly argued that sections of the army should consist "mostly of persons from the same region, caste or profession." (93) Using a little common sense, we can see that he is suggesting that men of an army should know one another, that an army of friends fighting side by side is the most difficult to defeat. On the subject of the king's location during battle, for example, he wrote: "A bare army, without standards, consisting of warriors related as fathers, sons and brothers, should be the place for the king. An elephant or a chariot should be the vehicle for the king, guarded by cavalry." (94)(Kautilya wanted a man who looked like the king to lead the army into battle.(95))

And thus, a king's power, for Kautilya, is in the end tied to the power and popular energy of the people, without which a king can be conquered, for "not being rooted among his subjects, [a king] becomes easy to uproot." (96) Although Kautilya wrote of using money to raise an army and even of "purchasing heroic men," (97) he was not advocating mercenaries who fought only for pay, but he was merely outlining the cost of paying, supplying, and feeding soldiers. He believed that "hereditary troops are better than hired troops" (98) ; in other words, troops made of men born in the kingdom and thus loyal to the king since birth are better than strangers fighting for money, as Machiavelli noted so often later. It is not at all clear, remarked Kautilya, that "inviting alien troops with money" (99) is an advantage or a disadvantage.

Which States to Attack:

In Kautilya's view of the world, expansion by a prosperous kingdom was inevitable, natural, and good, and as a consequence, moral considerations did not enter into his deliberations, only what was for the good of the kingdom. If a king can win, then he should go to war. As Kangle says, the Arthasastra"preaches an ideal of conquest." (100) But who should be attacked? This is not an ethical question. The decision takes only careful calculation and observes the principle that a king should attack weakness. Certain states are vulnerable. If a kingdom is weakened from a poor economy, or if a state has experienced some kind of calamity ranging from fires to flood or famine, then a king "should make war and march." (102) As Rajendra Prasad says, Kautilya believed that "whenever an enemy king is in trouble, and his subjects are exploited, oppressed, impoverished and disunited, he should be immediately attacked after one proclamation of war."(103)

Every adjacent kingdom should be looked upon as an enemy and classified. If a kingdom is strong, Kautilya called it a "foe"; if a kingdom is suffering calamity, then it is "vulnerable"; if a kingdom has weak or no popular support, then "it is fit to be exterminated." Even if one cannot attack a strong neighbor or "foe," one can harass it silently and weaken it over time. (104) What Kautilya called an enemy "fit to be exterminated" was an enemy with little or no popular support, an enemy whose subjects quite likely would desert to Kautilya's attacking army. (105) And Kautilya argued, or perhaps assumed, that imperial expansion was the correct goal: "After conquering the enemy's territory, the conqueror should seek to seize the middle king, after succeeding over him, the neutral king. This is the first method of conquering the world. . .And after conquering the world he should enjoy it divided into varnas . . . in accordance with his own duty." (106)

In Kautilya's mind, treaties were agreements between kingdoms of roughly equal power, agreements a king should break if they are no longer advantageous, and thus, believing that a treaty will provide a wall of protection against a strong enemy would be a foolish act. If an ally with whom a king has a treaty becomes weakened, that is, if the treaty is no longer to a king's advantage, then the king "should violate the treaty," (107) or, "when after making a pact he intends to violate it, . . . he should demand a gain not received or more." (108) Because Kautilya thought that promises or agreements were strategies and not moral obligations, he had no moral qualms about violating a promise and recommended that "The commander of a frontier fort, by offering the surrender of the fort, should get part of the (enemy's) troops inside and destroy [them] when full of trust." (109) To protect his own people, a king has an obligation to weaken or destroy any potential enemy: "That ally who might do harm or who, though capable, would not help in times of trouble, he should certainly exterminate him, when trustingly, he comes within his reach." (110) Charles Drekmeier is certainly correct in saying that, "In outlining military campaigns Kautilya disregards the traditional humanitarian principles laid down to regulate the conduct of war." (112) In Book 9, Kautilya listed various "hindrances to gain"; among them were pity, piousness, and "regard for the other world." (113) In short, in waging war, compassion and morality and religious principles have no place, unless they are useful for bringing victory.

In another way, moral considerations did enter into Kautilya's calculations. Whereas it is best to wage war against an unjust king who has no public support, it is wise to avoid war with a righteous king whose subjects will fight energetically on his behalf. Kautilya noted that if one has a choice about where to attack, it is always best to attack an unjust kingdom, because "The subjects help the king who is justly behaved... Therefore, [a king] should march only against [an enemy] with disaffected subjects." (114) Once more, morality is sometimes advantageous and in one's self-interest, for "The unjustly behaved [king] would cause even settled land to be laid waste." (115) By being unjust, a king loses all popular support, thereby weakening the kingdom and making it easily conquered: "The king fit to be exterminated, being without support or with weak support, is deserted by his subjects when, on being attacked, he wishes to flee taking with him the treasury and the army." (116) If a king has a choice of attacking a strong king who is unjust or a weak king who is just, he should actually attack the stronger king, because the stronger king's subjects, weary of injustice, will not help the strong king and might even join the war against him. (117) An unjust state is really two states, already at war with one another, the rulers and the ruled.(118) Kautilya paused to remind a king how practical it was to be just toward his subjects because "Subjects, when impoverished, become greedy; when greedy they become disaffected; when disaffected they either go over to the enemy or themselves kill the master. Therefore, [a king] should not allow these causes of decline, greed and disaffection among the subjects to arise, or, if arisen, should immediately counter-act them." (119) A domestic political policy of social justice is, in the long run, the best defense against outside enemies, because "one attacking a righteous king is hated by his own people and by others; one attacking an unrighteous king is liked (by them)." (120)

Kautilya maintained that a humanitarian policy toward a defeated people was practical. If a king massacres those whom he has defeated, then he frightens all those kingdoms that surround him and terrifies even his own ministers. (121) Rather, one gains more land and new and loyal subjects if one treats the defeated in a magnanimous manner. Certainly a conquering king must silently kill those former leaders loyal to the defeated king, but those who approach him promising loyalty should be treated generously: "He should not use towards them insults, injuries, contemptuous words or reproaches. And after promising them safety, he should make them slaves" (122) Because a conquering king intends to expand his territory and acquire new subjects, he must treat a defeated people well. The victor, "after gaining new territory . . . should cover the enemy's faults with his own virtue, his virtues with double virtues. He should carry out what is agreeable and beneficial to his subjects by doing his own duty as laid down, granting favours, giving exemptions, making gifts and showing honour." (123) Indeed, the conquering king should "order the release of all prisoners and render help to the distressed, the helpless and the diseased." (124) It is sound military policy to "establish a righteous course of conduct." (125) What is moral is once more practical. Just as one can kill a traitor, but cannot use force "against a multitude of people," (126) so one can kill the leaders of a defeated kingdom, but must bring the great majority of the citizens peacefully into one's own kingdom. In this instance, Kautilya was following the traditional advice given in the Dharmas-utras that "Aryans condemn the killing of those who have thrown down their weapons, who have dishevelled hair, who fold their hands in supplication, or who are fleeing." (127) And by these actions, Kautilya fit his own definition of a righteous conqueror who sought victory and the submission of the enemy, but not greedy pillaging or lawless killing. (128)

Kautilya demanded much of his soldiers, because they had to be brave and fierce in battle, but gentle and kind toward those whom they had defeated: "When attacking the enemy's fort or camp, they should grant safety to those fallen down, those turning back, those surrendering, those with loose hair, those without weapons, those disfigured by terror and to those not fighting." (129) After a king has subdued the country and taken care of the people, he should "grant safety to the countryside," settle subjects down to farm the land, and "induce" even those who had fought against him to settle down and farm (even by giving tax exemptions), all because the countryside needs farmers and the new kingdom wants prosperity. "For," according to Kautilya, "there is no country without people and no kingdom without a country," meaning a prosperous—not a ravished—countryside. (130)

Both Sun Tzu (c. 400-320 B.C.E.) and Machiavelli, in books entitled The Art of War, pointed out that a general should always give an enemy the hope of escape and never surround a nearly defeated enemy completely. (131) Enemy soldiers who have hope of living will eventually run for safety, and they are easily killed, but soldiers surrounded with no choice but to fight or die will fight with an unimagined ferocity. Kautilya was arguing something similar, to let the enemy soldiers know that the king will be generous in victory, will allow defeated soldiers to return to their land, and will take no reprisals except toward the leaders of the opposing kingdom, against whom "he should act as in 'the infliction of (secret) punishment.'" (132) After such humanitarian policies toward the defeated populace have become widely known, ordinary enemy soldiers will surrender in great numbers. By contrast, if a king announces that he will massacre every soldier, then all will fight to the death. Said Kautilya, "The vehemence of one returning again to the fight and despairing of his life becomes irresistible; therefore, [a king] should not harass a broken enemy." (134) Similarly, he advised that "to fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed." (135)

A conquering king should reassure a defeated people that not much, except their rulers, will change. The king who has triumphed "should adopt a similar character, dress, language and behavior (as the subjects). And he should show the same devotion in festivals in honour of deities of the country, festive gatherings and sportive amusements." (136) He should keep his promises, especially to those who helped him win, he should honor the local "deities," and he should make grants of land and money to men distinguished in wisdom and piety. (137) And the conquering king should show his goodwill toward the defeated by instituting "a righteous custom, not initiated before." (138) While the victorious king is reassuring the general population with generous policies, he must continue to kill anyone who is dangerous and those who are disgruntled: "He should put down by silent punishment those capable of injuring [him] or those brooding on the master's destruction." (139) In what might be a surprising observation about those whom the king has killed, Kautilya commented that if one must kill a dangerous person, the king must leave his property untouched and "shall not covet the land, property, sons or wives of the slain one." (140) Kautilya had the same insight into human emotions that Machiavelli had nearly eighteen hundred years later. Said Machiavelli, "And when [the prince] is obliged to take the life of any one, . . . he must abstain from taking the property of others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony." (141) A king becomes hated more readily for taking the property that belongs to a family than for killing the head of the family.

Using Secret Agents, Assassins, Disinformation, and Propaganda:

Kautilya was ready to use almost any means of violence in fighting a war, although he wanted his king to direct his violence toward the leaders of the opposing kingdom and not toward ordinary people. For example, Kautilya discussed at length how to employ poison, but almost always directed its use at key enemy commanders. He advised that when "giving unadulterated wine to the army chiefs, [the secret agent] should give them (wine) mixed with poison when they are in a state of intoxication." (142) Whereas Kautilya did suggest that an army laying siege to a fort try to "defile the water," (143) this measure seems designed to make those in the fort surrender from illness, not to kill everyone in the fort. Mostly, Kautilya addressed the question of how to assassinate a king—by hiding "inside the image of a deity or a hollow wall" and emerging at night, by making something heavy fall on the king, or by using women as secret agents to "drop on him serpents or poisonous fire and smoke." (144) Kautilya was willing to use any possible means to assassinate an enemy king—drown him, burn him with fire, suffocate him with smoke, or even use crocodiles as assassins, not to mention employing women and children as poison-givers. (145) The wonder of assassination, according to Kautilya, is that it is so efficient, "for, an assassin, single-handed, may be able to achieve his end with weapon, poison and fire. He does the work of a whole army or more." (146) In an unrealistic passage in the Dharmasutras that Kautilya most certainly ignored, the authors directed that a king should not "strike with barbed or poisoned weapons"! (147)

Aside from assassination, another method used to defeat an enemy without full-scale battle was to arrange for the enemy to quarrel and fight among itself. We have already seen how Kautilya intended to use beautiful women to instigate fights among high officers or officials. If the promise of pleasure can ignite quarrels, so can the promise of power. One should arrange for a secret agent, disguised as an astrologer, to tell a high officer that he has all the marks of a king, and similarly arrange for a female secret agent, the wife of this officer, to complain that the king wants to keep her in his harem. A third secret agent who is a cook or a waiter should lie, saying that the king has ordered him or her to poison the high officer. "Thus with one or two or three means," according to Kautilya, the king "should incite the high officers one by one to fight or desert" the enemy king. (148) In a discussion about sowing dissensions among oligarchies, Kautilya suggested that "assassins should start quarrels by injuring objects, cattle or men at night," "should stir up princelings enjoying low comforts with (a longing for) superior comforts," and "should start quarrels among the followers of the chiefs in the oligarchy by praising the opponents in brothels and taverns." (149) The goals were constantly to "sow discord" and to foment and inflame "mutual hatred, enmity and strife." (150)

Much of this advice violated the tacit code of war found in the great Indian epics. The assassination of envoys and the use of poison were considered to be against the rules of warfare and thus not honorable. Said The Laws of Manu, "Fighting in battle, [the king] should not kill his enemies with weapons that are concealed, barbed, or smeared with poison or whose points blaze with fire." (151) Spies were common in Indian history, but not spies who assassinated enemy officials and started quarrels among enemy leaders. (152) An excellent book on warfare in ancient India discusses spies, but does not mention secret agents as assassins. (153) Once more Kautilya judged the means by the result, and the result he sought was the general good of his kingdom.

Another military tactic that Kautilya praised was what we now call disinformation or propaganda designed to demoralize or frighten enemy soldiers. For example, secret agents should appear as messengers to troops saying, "Your fort has been burnt down or captured; a revolt by a member of your family has broken out; or, your enemy or a forest chieftain has risen (against you)." (154) After spreading the rumor that the Regent or a high administrator of the enemy king has announced that the king is in trouble and may not come back alive and thus people should take wealth by force and kill their enemies, secret agents should kill and steal at night, trying to cause civil upheaval: "When the rumour has spread far and wide, assassins should rob citizens at night and slay chiefs, (saying at the time), 'Thus are dealt with [those] who do not obey the Regent.'" (155) Then they should put bloody evidence in the Regent's residence. Again, secret agents should spread rumors, always in a confidential manner, that the king is furious with such and such a leader. Then these agents should assassinate key leaders and say "to those who have not been slain, . . . 'This is what we had told you; he who wants to remain alive should go away.'" (156) Kautilya was especially fond of the tactic of utilizing disinformation to flatter a second or third son and thus persuade him to try a coup against his own family. (157) Convinced that disinformation could also inspire his own troops, Kautilya wanted agents to announce fabricated victories and fictitious defeats of the enemy: "On the occasion of a night-battle, [secret agents] should strike many drums, fixed beforehand as a signal, and announce, 'We have entered it; the kingdom is won.'" (158)

Much of this disinformation made use of religion. Placed strategically, astrologers "should fill [the king's] side with enthusiasm by proclaiming his omniscience and association with divine agencies, and should fill the enemy's side with terror." (159) Once more the needs of the state are primary, and the king commands religion to serve the state: "He should make (Brahmins) recite blessings invoking victory and securing heaven." (160) Singers and poets should "describe the attainment of heaven by the brave and the absence of heaven for cowards." (161) Secret agents who have infiltrated the enemy side should use animal blood in order to "cause an excessive flow (of blood) from honoured images of deities," and then interpret that as a sure sign of future defeat for the enemy. (162) Kautilya wanted anyone associated with religion or superstition—"soothsayers, interpreters of omens, astrologers, reciters ofPuranas" and so on (163) —to proclaim to his own troops and to the enemy the king's "association with divinities" or "his meeting with divinities," (164) creating confidence on his own side and simultaneously terror and misgivings among enemy soldiers. Those priests in charge of interpreting omens must make certain that dreams and other signs are always favorable to the king's efforts and unfavorable to the enemy. (165) Every kind of superstition can be useful. (167) And for Kautilya, religious authorities must be for hire.

In addition to brave and well-equipped soldiers, warfare requires deception, and over and again Kautilya advocated the above measures and more for deceiving both his own and the enemy troops. If caught behind enemy lines, Kautilya outlined ways for one to escape "in the disguise of a heretical monk," "decked out as a corpse," or "wearing a woman's garb." (168) And he was eager to terrify the enemy by such multiple and varied means as by using "machines, by the employment of occult practices, through assassins slaying those engaged in something else, by magical arts, by (a show of) association with divinities, through carts, by frightening with elephants," and so on. (169) A favorite tactic in battle was to pretend to be defeated, retreat in apparent disorder, and then attack a disorganized and unsuspecting enemy. The leader, "feigning a rout with treasonable, alien and forest troops . . . should strike at the (pursuing enemy when he has) reached unsuitable ground." (170) At all times, Kautilya wanted his king to use deception, play roles, and create appearances. Why risk heavy losses or even defeat in battle if deception and assassination can weaken or even defeat the enemy? Even if a king is forced to surrender in order to survive, Kautilya wanted him to pretend that his surrender was "an excellent thing" until he was clever or strong enough to fight back. (171) Warfare was violent, but it also called for one who could calmly create false impressions, like a poker player.

Conclusion:

To return to Machiavelli's The Art of War after reading the military writings of Kautilya is jolting. It becomes readily apparent that Machiavelli is not even trying to tell us something new about warfare, because he believed the ancient Greeks and Romans knew it all—aside from such things as artillery. What did Machiavelli want to resurrect from ancient Rome and transport to Renaissance Florence? He wanted Rome's battalions and legions and cohorts, and maybe Scipio once again arrayed across the plain from Hannibal. And thus compared to Kautilya, Machiavelli's writings on warfare are tired and tedious, filled with nostalgia for long-dead legions that once gained glory. He wanted the public battlefield, the grand spectacle, fame for some and cowardice for others.

Kautilya did not care a whit for glory and fame. Kautilya wanted to win at all costs and to keep casualties highest on the enemy side.

Kautilya was also prepared to win in ways Machiavelli would regard as dishonorable and disgraceful—assassination, disinformation, causing quarrels between ministers by bribes or by means of jealousy over a beautiful woman planted as a secret agent, and so on. Machiavelli—who offers no systematic discussion of even guerrilla warfare—would have been easily outmatched by generals reading Kautilya.

Edited by Arslanus

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^^^^^^^^^

Vivek what you say does not seem credible, when the bulk of indian forces are "orientated in space" towards Pakistan - if it was the case that the indian armed forces were against the PRC - would we not see the difference on the "chess board".

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These is a lot of hue and cry in Western Media on how Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world i.e. a nuclear armed unstable country, where militants could get hold of nukes any time and undermine the world as they (i.e. the west) knows it or in other words potentially challenge 500 hundred years of western domination of the world. Well if you think about it the root cause of the situation is is due to India and its policies towards Pakistan since the begining. If India had settled on Kashmir at independence, Pakistan would not have pursued the military build-up that it did. An extension of that if India had not tried to do what it did in East Pakistan, we would most probably not have pursued a nuclear program even supported the initial sikh militancy. Thanks to Indian hegomenic attitude and non acceptance of Pakistan as an independent entity, Pakistan is a militarily strong nuclear power and despite all the challenges it faces it is force to be reckoned and it has still a lot of upside potential left in. We are what we are despite all the screw-ups, corruption, political mismanagement just imagine what we can be if we get it right. So thank you India for making us what we are today, we will return the favour soon, tied to the tip of a Shaheen.

Edited by Boota

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^^^^^^^^^

Vivek what you say does not seem credible, when the bulk of indian forces are "orientated in space" towards Pakistan - if it was the case that the indian armed forces were against the PRC - would we not see the difference on the "chess board".

I assume you're referring to the Indian Army (only one facet of the armed forces). Yes, most of its mechanised forces are Pakistan centric - the Chinese border being unsuitable tank country - but that's the way its always been.

6 of the IA's 13 Corps are intended for Pakistan specific operations, 3 of them are China specific and another 4 are dual tasked. Similarly, 7 of the PA's 9 Corps are deployed against India with the remaining two based in NWFP and Balochistan, but available as reserves.

There hasn't been a significant change in the force structure aside from basic modernization that was overlooked in 90s (eg. phasing out of T-55s, induction of drones etc). All new formations raised have been China specific (two new divisions + expected Mountain Strike Corps). At a strategic level, the real change has been in the air force and navy, which is widely believed to be China specific (new air fields, upgrade of bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands).

It appears to me that the indian military is planning for a worst case scenario i.e. a two front war, rather than an attempt to browbeat Pakistan.

Edited by Vivek

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To understand Indian State, the mindset and intend has to be scrutinized - the duplicitous policy. Quite a read as most, if not all can be matched with current Hindutva Indian ideology in place, to sum-up the Indian Government's imbroglio in clarity - most Kautilyan principles are copied from here and there(including a few from Muslims), requires a patient read. How can you face and defeat that?

I have trouble visualizing Dr. Manmohan Singh, a Sikh born in Pakistan, and Sonia Gandhi, a Catholic born in Italy, sitting and discussing foreign policy while using a 2000 year old Indian treatise on governance as a reference tool.

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