Ayub Khan's Diaries

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An interesting exchange of articles on Ayub Khans Diaries.

http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/03/ed.htm#4

Ayub’s diaries in perspective

By S. Sajad Haider

DISCERNING observers have been deeply perturbed by the expletives used in the ‘Diaries of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan: 1966-1972’ against the late military ruler’s opponents and dissenters. Ayub Khan was far ahead of all other dictators and usurpers when it came to obfuscating the truth and portraying himself as a national hero.

This was made possible because the plunderers and blunderers of this beleaguered nation have always left behind a powerful network of scions and beneficiaries who either kept their sins hidden away from the reach of students of history or projected themselves through propaganda sustained by the power of embezzled and stolen wealth.

What stands out in some excerpts that I read of the diaries is Ayub Khan’s contempt for and denigration of every single one of his former colleagues who turned hostile to his despotic and dishonest policies and rebelled after perceptive deliberation. He has used belittling adjectives and indulged in fictitious conjectures about highly successful professionals such as Asghar Khan, a man of sterling character.

Other targets include General Azam Khan, the most successful governor of former East Pakistan. He was sacked because his popularity with the Bengalis for securing their rights was construed as a threat to Ayub’s power. About Akbar Bugti, he wrote , “Fancy Bugti becoming a governor. No bigger scoundrel could be found anywhere.” I am a witness to the fact that Bugti as governor of Balochistan was financially clean and rabidly strict about the misuse of government resources, an attribute Ayub Khan could never qualify for.

The list is too long for this article but it is enough to say that none of Ayub Khan’s detractors have been spared. The real surprise, however, was his view of Air Marshal Nur Khan, one of Ayub Khan’s few respected admirers and a hugely successful commander and leader. Ayub Khan refers to him as ambitious and responsible for the destruction of Pakistan, when he himself was a victim of his professional inferiority and his damning failure in perpetrating a senseless war in1965, for which he neither had a plan nor the courage to carry through. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has been the prime target in the diaries simply because of his success as a populist leader.

With regard to Air Marshal Asghar Khan, this is what is written in the diaries:

“Asghar Khan, former commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Air Force…today held a press conference in Lahore and launched a scathing attack on the government…Asghar Khan has seen fit to make a vile attack on the government and its policies based on half-truths and downright falsehoods. This neurotic and unreasoned person may surprise strangers but those who know him well are well aware that it is nothing but fulminations of a shallow, frustrated…introvert…not above cunning and deceit…Even in service he used to keep odd company and his associates have been working on him since his retirement to come out with such a statement. In doing so he has disgraced his uniform apart from setting a poor example for his service. Be that as it may be, he has to be countered and met…Chances are that people will soon find out that he is tongue-tied, superficial and lacks charisma.”

His son, renowned for filching successful businesses and touring about on a jeep mounted with automatic weapons to terrorise the voters of Fatima Jinnah, had this comment to make about the redoubtable Asghar Khan: “They (the Pakistanis) soon realised that he was limited and shallow.” Talk of being shallow!

The diatribe has little veracity and reads like the requiem of a tortured soul who knew that he had violated and rubbished the constitution, usurped power illegally and had it legitimised by the then most disrespected Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Muhammad Munir. He scorned the indomitable courage of intrepid and successful commanders-in-chief.

Asghar Khan prepared the Pakistan Air Force as a formidable fighting machine and took PIA to new heights. He himself has remained a symbol of dignity and honesty.

In choosing to enter politics, did Asghar Khan commit a crime? Was politics only for Ayub and his family fiefdom? Who gave his sons and friends the nation’s silver such as Ghandhara Motors and Sherazad Hotel, and business contracts to generals he considered a threat? Did Asghar Khan not have the right to raise his voice against tyranny, graft, nepotism and the alienation of East Pakistanis through contempt and conduct of pompous bureaucrats like Aziz Ahmed?

What about the strategic and tactical blunders and lack of courage in the 1965 war where elite commandos were put in the mouth of hell in the disgracefully botched Operation Gibraltar? What about trembling when the Indians attacked West Pakistan, and stopping a winning general, Akhtar Malik, from taking Akhnoor which would have decided the Kashmir imbroglio? What about stopping Chinese premier Zhou Enlai from sending Mig fighters by air to Sargodha on Sept 7 and 8, asking him instead to crate and send them by ships so as not to provoke the Indians and Americans?

When the war started, Ayub Khan was already imploring for a ceasefire as stated by Zhou Enlai, after the PAF and a handful of soldiers had wrought havoc on the enemy ranks on the ground and in the air and as the precious blood of our fighter pilots and soldiers was flowing at Halwara, Wagah, Chawinda and Kasur. What was Asghar Khan’s crime other than to tell the masses the incontrovertible truth?

For some inexplicable reason, Ayub Khan has been beamed up from his final resting place and transported into the present to issue expletives against his detractors and those who stood up to him on the strength of their own integrity, professional excellence and financial honesty. No one can cast aspersions on the achievements and integrity of an icon like Asghar Khan, least of all Ayub Khan.

There is no evidence in history of Ayub Khan’s bravery or professional integrity. In the words of General Sher Ali, “Ayub’s knowledge of strategy was limited to barrack and battalion” and he was removed by General Reese in the Burma campaign of 1945 for declining the command of an operational regiment in front of the officer corps.

Today, I am embarrassed by the men in charge of our destiny. We have been rendered servile and meek hostages to maulvis because no one had the courage to raise their voices when Liaquat Ali Khan demolished the Quaid’s vision of Pakistan’s future with one stroke of his pen with the Objectives Resolution. That was the first nail in the coffin of a progressive, egalitarian Pakistani society. That is when the mullah raised his head and never looked back.

By March 1953, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the cursed Ahrar and other extremist organisations had resorted to killing and plunder in Karachi and later in Lahore against the Qadiani dispensation. Meanwhile, the foxy Punjab Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana supported the Ahrars and their ilk by rescinding orders to ban inciting jalsas and fiery speeches by feuding parties supported by the extremists, especially the Ahrars.

A nudge from the army led by Ayub Khan with Defence Secretary Iskandar Mirza appointed as the government’s point man in Lahore set the stage for the doom of democracy, religious tolerance, accountability of any kind of anyone, and proved an opportune rehearsal for the army’s role in civil administration. Ayub Khan waited in the shadows with a script that read ‘how to exploit the demon of civil unrest to usurp power through martial law’.

How ironical that the situation more than five decades ago has been reignited in the horrible carnage in Karachi.

Today, in Islamabad, the Lal Masjid renegades are part of a replay. The carnage in Karachi in 1953 spread to Lahore but with a different hue; it was turned into anti-middle class rioting and murder. On March 4, 1953, the extremists had set up an alternative government in a mosque and a police officer who had gone to placate the supporters of the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Ahrar was murdered in cold blood. (Does this not sound jarringly familiar to the law-abiding residents of Aabpara and E-7?)

On March 6 martial law was declared which suited Ayub Khan, Iskandar Mirza and above all the rogue Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad. It signified the beginning of the end of the Quaid’s democratic and non-racist Pakistan that was meant to be free from sectarian tensions. In the successive years, the demon of martial law with all its devastating jargons such as the decade of reforms, green revolution and Zia’s hypocritical Sharia descended on the nation.

I will ask readers to judge which man conducted himself with dignity, courage and resolve against successive martial laws and was financially honest and censured nepotism: Asghar Khan or Ayub Khan?

Let us learn from our past mistakes if we want to survive with some dignity. For this we need to demonstrate the courage to disentangle our national, institutional (especially pertaining to the defence forces) and individual errors and falsehoods, and desist from falsifying and glorifying our failures. Let us stand up and be counted. The leaders of the past colluded with the plunderers to consolidate themselves. Let us rise and take account of all those who have filched even a rupee from the share of the poor and the wretched.

The writer is a retired commodore of the PAF.

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http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/08/letted.htm#11

Ayub’s diaries in perspective

COMMODORE ® S. Sajjad Haider in his article, ‘Ayub’s diaries in perspective’ (June 3), defends Air Marshal ® Asghar Khan. Every human being is an amalgam of qualities and weaknesses.

Can anyone give a single example in the world where during a conflict the country’s Air Chief telephones his opponent, without the knowledge of the Army Commander-in-Chief, suggesting that both air forces stay out of the conflict? Air Marshal ® Asghar Khan did precisely this during the Rann of Kutch conflict in 1965. His retirement orders from the Air Force soon followed.

A lot has been said by the commodore. Detailed answers and more he will find in my book, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power to be launched on July 31.

GOHAR AYUB KHAN

Islamabad

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http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/11/letted.htm#1

Ayub’s diaries

GOHAR Ayub’s letter (June 8) is an incontrovertible acceptance of my article commenting on former President Ayub Khan’s diaries. Interestingly, Gohar Ayub has gone off tangent from the indefensible contents of the diaries hence the acrimonious diatribe.

Today’s attack on Asghar Khan with reference to the Raan of Kutch skirmish has been taken from Gen Musa’s book My Version. History till matric is distorted odiously, thus the void. What is the credibility of Gen Musa who turned a near victory in 1965 to a massacre of gallant soldiers and commandos in Kashmir and is responsible for the blood of martyrs at Wagha, Attari and Berki on Sept 6?

The betrayal was caused because Musa had failed to order red alert for the army, instead kept it on peace time status with 25 per cent troops on leave even as the Indian invaders were about to enter Lahore. My Version is an uncanny self-indictment, replete with blatant untruths and blame game.

Now about the call by Air Marshal Asghar Khan to AM Arjun Singh and its ramifications: it’s a blatant inference that Asghar Khan was removed owing to this call. He had completed eight magnificent years to create a formidable air force and had refused further extension when asked by Ayub in 1964. Nur Khan has personally assured me of both facts repeatedly.

Gohar Ayub’s letter reflects sheer ignorance about air operations and his peer, Gen. Musa. The area of conflict, Bier Bet, in Kutch, was in easy operational reach of the IAF bases in the vicinity; particularly Bhuj air base with several fighter squadrons was less than 10 minutes from the battle front.

Far from the land battle area, our fighters would take 35 minutes to react and on the fringe of operational radius, without fuel for air combat. The Indian troops were well dug-in and difficult to locate and attack. Our fearless troops, cavalry men and personnel carriers were on the move and exposed dangerously to enemy air attack.

Besides the fighter base at Bhuj, Jamnagar, fighter bases at Uterlai and Jaisalmir were about 18-25 minutes away. Had the Indians committed their air force in support of their army, our troops would have been mowed down from the air and destroyed with impunity, bringing our land operation to a

halt.

History of the Rann skirmish would have been written differently had AM Asghar Khan not taken a unique initiative to keep the air forces out of the battle. Even though his action was somewhat utopian under the circumstances, his guarded warning to ACM Arjun Singh worked like a charm.

Asghar Khan suggested to AM Arjun Singh that he should try to influence their political leaders to hold back the air force in order to avoid escalation, with an undertone that if the Indian air force was committed into action, the PAF may opt to hit targets anywhere it chose, not restricted to the Rann sands and swamps.

Luckily Arjun Singh resisted the order of his defence minister Kaul to attack our troops using some pretext which was accepted; but his wisdom lay in heeding to Asghar Khan’s guarded warning. If Gen Musa had the moral strength, he would have written and thanked Asghar Khan for his astuteness and saving lives of our gallant fighting men instead of bickereing and whimpering to Ayub Khan about Asghar calling Arjun Singh without informing him or even the president; both had a poor soldiering history and could not have comprehended the air chief’s sagacity.

SAJAD HAIDER

Islamabad

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Ayub’s diaries in perspective

WELL done Sajjad Haider on a brilliant expose of shallow thinking and unsavoury remarks by Gohar Ayub about Air Marshal Asghar Khan in his letter (June 11).

I may like to add for readers interested in knowing that the ghost writer of Ayub’s diaries, Gohar Ayub, got commissioned in the Pakistan Army after graduating from Sandhurst.

He later joined his father’s unit 5 Punjab Regiment (famously ‘Sherdils’) and after rendering service for a couple of years, good old daddy (lovingly Khan Jee) ordered his release, just before the 1965 war, to help his father-in-law in running the industrial and business estate, viz Gandhara Motors.

Similarly, his elder brother, Capt Akhtar Ayub, was asked to resign and take care of their family estate.

Interestingly, Gen Eisenhower, president of the US, during World War II had ordered his son to continue as war correspondent till the end of the war, an example which was worth emulation by the late FM, in his own case.

Another faithful duty performed by a loyal son was the celebration of his father’s victory in rigged elections against Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah when he led supporters in an open jeep and ordered firing on Mohajirs to avenge the dissenting vote.This speaks volumes of the so-called patriotism of the late FM and his progeny, who has the cheek to question the loyalty of Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the founder, the builder and a hero of the Pakistan Air Force.

My father, Gen Yahya Khan, once in a private conversation with Ayub Khan, asked him why he allowed his sons to leave the army, to which he replied: “After all they are kids who have to take care of our family fortunes.”

ALI YAHYA KHAN

Rawalpindi

(II)

I was a junior USAF officer with the office of the US air attache at the old US embassy in Karachi at the time of the 1965 Rann of Kutch battle(s). In fact, I was wounded on an innocent boar hunt in a PIA Land Rover, as the guest of Pakistani friends and business acquaintances who were key PIA officials, as we drove through this area on Jan 31, 1965.

A surprise Indian tank shell blew another Pakistani truck coming towards us in the marsh area, injuring all of us pretty badly.

This said, I have read much of the history of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, but also lived there during that war to have been "on the scene" literally.

This wordy preamble aside, foreign minister Bhutto largely engineered the foolish events that caused or incited the 1965 war. Ayub Khan had to have known what was going on, but his chief ‘goader’, if you will, into this war was Bhutto.

Neither Air Marshal Asghar Khan nor the chief of the Pakistan Navy was involved in the 1965 war pre-planning or early on execution of that war by Mr Bhutto and the then Pakistan Army chief of staff. The air marshal rightly and sanely telephoned his Indian counter-part to immediately do what he and they could to limit this sudden, unexpected hot conflict which was not expected by the air marshal of Pakistan or the chief of the Pakistan Navy.

In my view, living there at the time, I saw and still see Air Marshal Khan as a hero of immense proportions for his brave actions to limit and damp down the start of this ill- fated war as quickly as he could.

The 1965 war was a monstrously dumb move on the part of Mr Bhutto and the Pakistani Army chief of staff's who clearly initiated the whole war.

Your letter writer jumps to a wrong conclusion about Air Marshal Ashgar Khan, who I had met several times between 1963 and 1965 at my headquarters in Peshawar, the old US air base there. I was the USAF base liaison officer in the US embassy in Karachi.

In fact, Air Marshal Khan promptly resigned in protest over this unwarranted and wasteful war in 1965 which he had no part in planning or starting. Subsequently, the air marshal entered politics, was elected to your national legislature, was briefly jailed by his political opponent, Mr Bhutto, and then lost elective office. The air marshall has authored over 28 books, some related to this 1965 war, which the letter writer might want to read or re -read to be better informed.

COL ® GEORGE L. SINGLETON, USAF,

Alabama, USA

http://dawn.com/2007/06/14/letted.htm#1

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Perspective on the 1965 war

FOR the benefit of both Pakistan and world history, my experiences at the start-up of the series of battles between Pakistan and India in 1965 could be of historic perspective interest in view of the recent letters about Ayub's diaries and the 1965 war with India.

The advent of the Rann of Kutch skirmish between Pakistani and Indian ground forces, Jan 31, 1965 which, in military intelligence (US) annals, was preceded by bombardments in the disputed Kashmir area and the other less publicly-discussed December 1964 Rann of Kutch skirmishes caused the US State Department to call a joint high-level meeting of key Karachi and New Delhi US embassy staff held at the old US Embassy in Karachi, early spring (March), 1965, which I attended together with my boss, the colonel commanding the US Air Base in Peshawar.

Since 1963 I had been based at the US embassy in Karachi as the USAF liaison officer for the US Air Base in Peshawar, where about 1,000 US military, civilian dependants and civilian employees stood in harm’s way being so close to Kashmir.

In anticipation of the eventual Indian Air Force bombings of the PAF HQ in Peshawar during the 1965 war, we at our nearby base had dug and had to later use slit trenches to seek shelter during the eventual IAF bombings. Some humour during all this war tragedy was caused by water inside our slit trenches from a recent rain so that when our boys dived into the bomb shelter trenches they came up dripping with, covered with fresh mud!

Our meetings at the US embassy in Karachi, 1965, focused on ways and means to keep the peace between the two nations through our diplomatic efforts.

Once the war was at its hottest from April through fall, 1965, in spurts so to speak, US military equipment and spare parts were equally and uniformly 100 per cen cut off to both nations.

This did have a material effect to help end the war as once planes, tanks, and other military hardware broke down, there were no spare parts to repair same in either country.

One of my key duties was to keep uptodate at all times the military evacuation plan for our Peshawar-located air base.

Our evacuation plan had an ‘either/or’ use of a then single north/south rail line vs. use of American C-130s and C-141s to tactically or logistically bring all US men, women, and children, military and civilian, out of Peshawar in the event of war with ‘whomever’.

As the 1965 war intensified in spurts, the decision was made to evaluate the US air base by air, which was done by direct round robin flights from another US air base in Turkey, to Peshawar, and back to Turkey. The use of the north/south rail line was too slow and absurd under all then existing circumstances.

By 1970 the resumed base operations by military only personnel without civilian dependents at the US air base at Peshawar permanently ceased when Pakistan refused to renew the treaty dating from 1955 which had established in 1958 the joint US-Pakistani intelligence base at the height of the Cold War.

I was, of course, rotated out to another USAF stateside assignment in mid-1965, so I was not involved in the 1970 final removal of all US personnel and equipment. However, on Jan 7, 1970 when our base was finally closed for good, we used both the airlift and the north/south rail line to complete our base closure withdrawal.

The final 1970 base evacuation was done under the unchanged, since my 1965 written updates, USAF base evacuation plan from what colleagues there at the time have told me in later years.

George L. Singleton,

Colonel ®, USAF,

Alabama, USA

http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/27/letted.htm#1

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How unfortunate it is ?allegation and counter allegation

1.PAF was at disadvantage In Run of Kach agreed but it is little unprecedented for air force chiefe to call his oponant to seek some kind of tacit agreement.It was priogative of Foreigne ministry to indulge in such kind of threat game.Unfotunately it is undefendable

2.Was he ousted or he chose to leave PAF as protest over 1965 is to be determined however

it was in line With american policies as confirmed by Col(ret) George s singleton remarks about 1965 war.

3.1965 war was not initiated by Pakistan but was a result of premption to Operation''Ablaze" planed by India in Kashmir.The premption was through ''Gibraltor''which kept Indian Army busy from may 1965 till end of august 1965.After august a big scale miltary move is not fovoured by subsequent weather and time is little too short to complete big adventures.

4.Outstreched 12 division had lost the war after losing Haji peer and titwal and Indians were practicaly in position to threaton Muzaffarabad that is when elements of Army reserve(12 cav,8baloch) were prematuredly launched in grandslam who were availiable , by General Akhtar malik where as GOC 7 division General yahya and his division was still in concentration area and had to rush forword but he had to take time in order to take into account the situation which gave 3 precious days to Indians.

4.Ayub khan and his lust for power can not be disputed but he was intelligent enough for not entering war on Bhutto,s instigation he was forced into this war by India after Run of Kuch.

5.It is unfortunate indeed that in order to support the blame game our seniors unintentialy

had been supporting the indian propective of the war that include Bhutto and countless writers as well

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Ayub’s diaries

THIS is with reference to the debate on ‘Ayub’s diaries’ going on between President Ayub’s son Gohar Ayub Khan and Mr Sajjad Haider. In the June 11 rejoinder, Mr Haider seems to be seething with anger against both Ayub Khan and General Muhammad Musa whom he thinks was an incapable commander.

Mr Haider has accused Gen Musa of turning a near victory in the 1965 war into a massacre of soldiers in Kashmir, Wagah, Attari and Berki. He sounds as if it all was done deliberately by Musa himself. People can make mistakes – sometimes unknowingly. That seems the case with Mr Haider.

He has not taken the historical facts in the right perspective. Does he mean that there was no hand of any other person or institution? Does he think that the Indian army was not involved in it? He should know that all that untoward incidents took place, happened because of the Indian army. After all, it was a well-equipped large army capable of defeating our army’s intentions — which is any army’s first priority. When the Pakistan army was advancing in Kashmir, the Indian army opened new fronts in Lahore and Sialkot to thwart their advance; The Pakistan army pushed back the Indian army which had invaded Lahore on Sept 6, 1965. It is every army’s job. So it was not Gen Musa’s inefficiency.

As for his ‘near victory’ lament, I would like to ask him to look at this elusive victory from another angle. The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 is a unique war in recent history — both had won it. Both countries had one goal in the political and military leaders’ mind – to win. India’s morale was not very high after the defeat in the China-India war of 1962. It was Pakistan’s first big war. It had to win or die. So Ayub and Musa did their best and won.

For Indians it became a political war. If they cannot win militarily, they argued, they can defeat Pakistan by not letting it take Kashmir – which they did. Pakistan won militarily and lost the war politically – Kashmir is still in Indian hands.

M. K. NAQVI

Karachi

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Naqvi saheb is totally out of his mind discounting Sajjad Haider's points. The fact of the matter is 65 war can never be claimed as a victory by any side (despite the massive propaganda). Ayub being the president and Musa being the C-in-C should have resisted the urge to go to war by the Pakistani FM. The fact that we did not achieve our aims in 1965 and were actually put on the defensive by the Indian offensive (which we did hold back, but not as the goal of war, by that time, we were trying to save our rears) tells one a lot about this elusive "victory".

Musa Khan, although a very decent human being, was a yes-man and for exactly this reason appointed the C-in-C. He rose from the ranks which speak to his hard working ethics, but he was not a leader who could say "no" when it needed to be said. But then, Musa Khan was the little fish, I am not sure why and how Ayub Khan saheb got carried away by Mr. Bhutto's prodding?

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, I am not sure why and how Ayub Khan saheb got carried away by Mr. Bhutto's prodding?

Inflated Ego, Hubris, call it whatever you want. Who would in their right mind self-promotes himself to "Field Marshal"? That itself should give an indication of his mind set. One thign i credit both Zia and Musharaf is that they were sensible enough from trying to self-decorate their uniforms with more brass and medals.

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Naqvi saheb is totally out of his mind discounting Sajjad Haider's points. The fact of the matter is 65 war can never be claimed as a victory by any side (despite the massive propaganda). Ayub being the president and Musa being the CoAS should have resisted the urge to go to war by the Pakistani FM. The fact that we did not achieve our aims in 1965 and were actually put on the defensive by the Indian offensive (which we did hold back, but not as the goal of war, by that time, we were trying to save our rears) tells one a lot about this elusive "victory".

Musa Khan, although a very decent human being, was a yes-man and for exactly this reason appointed the CoAS. He rose from the ranks which speak to his hard working ethics, but he was not a leader who could say "no" when it needed to be said. But then, Musa Khan was the little fish, I am not sure why and how Ayub Khan saheb got carried away by Mr. Bhutto's prodding?

1.This is a myth nobody from Pakistan initiated the war.

2.Jibraltar was no more than premeption Indians had planed an offensive in Kashmir before we sent infiltrators

3.Operation grand slam was result of direct threat to Muzafarabad ,other wise no general untill and unless he is absolutely Insane would commit his Army reserves before the war.Trust me Ayub khan was not a fool .

4.Musa khan should be credited for successful defense,An armoured division fully commited was pulled back and switched to Sialkote which in itself is big accomplishment

during the war.

5.Indian plan was simple isolate lahore through armoured div attack in ravi chenab corridor and with two divisions advance across wahga lahore axis and capture lahore

destroy Pakistan Army in the process.They had managed 1"3 ratio in ravi chenab and ravi bias area but failed with their dreams.

6.Pakistan did not intitiated war for Kashmir but was forced into war for kashmir.

7.without being emotional it was a victory for Pakistan we had more area more POW,s and we defended ourselves against 5 times bigger enemy.

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1.This is a myth nobody from Pakistan initiated the war.

2.Jibraltar was no more than premeption Indians had planed an offensive in Kashmir before we sent infiltrators

6.Pakistan did not intitiated war for Kashmir but was forced into war for kashmir.

Nice to know that the 60s era Ayub-ism and Bhutto-ism is still alive and prospering today! - the information in letters of greats like Nosey Haider etc are lost on you..

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Nice to know that the 60s era Ayub-ism and Bhutto-ism is still alive and prospering today! - the information in letters of greats like Nosey Haider etc are lost on you..

I don,t get it ,Ayub and bhutto both did good job but for sure we had no war plan but just reacted to situation and reacted realy well.What information nosy haider gave please share it if possible

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Noman sahib,

Very many holes in your assumptions and arguments. :)

My post was not to denigrate the valor of Pakistanis during 1965. All I am saying is that this war was uneccessary and not needed. Taking more POWs and some more land than the other side would be of value had the land been in IoK. We used what we took to bargain for the return of our PoWs and land that Indians had taken and essentially ended up with nothing (or ended up where we had started).

IOKashmir was not ready for an uprising contrary to what Bhutto and some others had communicated to the Army's higher command. Op. Gibralter failed depite the valor and commitment of many very able Pakistani Army officers and men. I know this very well as one of the company commanders involved in this operation was my father's roommate at the SSG. He went on to write a book (Operation Gibralter in Urdu) which may be available in Pakistan even now. The book talks about the lack of will and overestimation of the local population's support and very many other things that went wrong.

Indian plan to isolate Lahore was a reactionary plan to lessen the pressure further up north (Pakistan taking HPP and also the activities in IOK). I mean the stuff that I am writing has been written a million times. 65 was a war that was not needed and served no purpose for us. It had its high points (in terms of uniting the country, however it would have been better if this had been achieved without bloodshed). Nothing and I mean absolutely nothing changed with regards to Kashmir.

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1.It came from Indian official history ,Jibraltar did delay their operation till end of august which is too late for sustained compeigne.

2.Indian operation ''Ablaze '' no details were availiable but few hints

a.PA was for more mobile than IA at least on papers plus better equiped

b.Paf had better quality equipment

3.In total India had definit edge in infantry and that edge was to be best utilised in a terrain where PA is unable to generate it full combat power that is Kashmir.

4.After loss of Haji peer Pass general Akhtar malik,s war was finished,knowing fully well the grand slam details he at his own launched the offensive in a hurry to save complete collaps of Kashmir.It is again worth discussing on who,s order it was done

5.Let us assume grand slam was complete success will it make Kashmir untaneable for India ?I say no an absolute no.India had no such fear but they got the oppertunity an off balance army who has launched their reserves already why not to take advantage,

6.Sir we were forced into war but if their are holes let me know we can discuss it

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Holes are in the argument that the war was forced on us. PAF and PA being better trained and equipped did nothing for us except to maybe save our own arses when the Indians launched the attack across the IB on the morning of 6th September.

To be very honest with you, I do not know one officer at least from my father's generation (who faught in the 65 war) who believe the war was necessary. You may differ and may be taken up by the articles about the valor of this and that individual, unit or formation, but know that most of these acts were in the process of our stubborn defence against the Indian attacks post 6th September. Offensively we failed to take advantage (tactical victories here and there matter little when the war did not reach its strategic goals) and there is no denying that. Our better training, equipment etc., did nothing for us to be able to achieve our goals. In the Rann affair, Indians instigated and were given a licking, however Op Gibralter was ill-conceived strategically and tactically very many mistakes were made.

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Here is a link to the cover article of Sept 17, 1965. Perhaps it would be better for us to see things as they were seen by the people at that time. I can myself see the sense of desperation in the Pakistani leadership about Kashmir at that time and how they reacted to how India was going about changing Kashmir. It could be that they made the right decision but did not execute it properly.

BTW, I did not know that there was a Pakistani armoured force moving very successfully towards/inside IHK when India attacked Lahore and Sialkot. This force had to be diverted to protect Sialkot. I wish it had not been diverted and had gone straight ahead to Srinagar.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842104-1,00.html

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Holes are in the argument that the war was forced on us. PAF and PA being better trained and equipped did nothing for us except to maybe save our own arses when the Indians launched the attack across the IB on the morning of 6th September.

To be very honest with you, I do not know one officer at least from my father's generation (who faught in the 65 war) who believe the war was necessary. You may differ and may be taken up by the articles about the valor of this and that individual, unit or formation, but know that most of these acts were in the process of our stubborn defence against the Indian attacks post 6th September. Offensively we failed to take advantage (tactical victories here and there matter little when the war did not reach its strategic goals) and there is no denying that. Our better training, equipment etc., did nothing for us to be able to achieve our goals. In the Rann affair, Indians instigated and were given a licking, however Op Gibralter was ill-conceived strategically and tactically very many mistakes were made.

1.It is not valour and their is nothing as bravedo everything evaporates when few shells go whistling by.

2.Army officers knows something about his front but an stretegic overview is not expected from him sometimes if trying to ask too many above ""level ''is suspicious.

3.The 65 war got overshadowed by Bhutto ayaub rivilaries

4.Akhtar hussien Malik though a very innovative commander was not suppose to launch

offensive in Chamb.It was to be lauched by 7division commanded by Yahya khan.

5.12 division was thinly streched from chamb to Kel sector with probabaly 9 battlions out of which 4 or 6 were mujahids with little offensive value

6.India had big edge in infantry and were desperat to avenge humiliation of Run of kach

where as Pakistan prefered negociation and situation was defused and Indians troops were pulled back from International borders.

7.Attack across IB was no longer an option for India But CFL as it used to be called was a different thing .Indian knew our weaknesses and decided to go ahead in Kashmir

8.The only chance we had was to make indian reserve fight (i think 13 battalions) inside the valley.This was the percise reason for operation Jibraltar.This operation saved Kashmir for us however by the end of august Indian army had managed to drive back most of these

forces.

9.Then indian offesive started and after loss of Haji pir pass and tetwal area 12 division was in no position to save Muzafarabad that is why our tanks roled across chumb in a hurry.

10.We anticipated that India has no reason to cross IB but Indians were on definit plan

and attack on lahore and sialkot was in no way a defensive move.

sorry i have been writing most of it by using memory however if you can find deployment of troops it will make it much easier to understand that war was not our option but was forced on us and we were totaly unprepared for it

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10.We anticipated that India has no reason to cross IB but Indians were on definit plan

and attack on lahore and sialkot was in no way a defensive move.

I don't know how and why they did not anticipate India to retaliate.

Looking at it from hindsight my thinking is that we should have put up proper defenses for the country, mobilized the Army, navy, and af. And then started Gibralter and Grand Slam. As they say, 'ya aar ya paar'.

If we had been prepared at the border then may be India would have thought twice about attacking the IB. And if it had gone ahead with the attack may be we would have done even better. And we would have figured out the right amount of resources needed for the WHOLE operation and the strategy.

I am very interested in finding out what other options, mainly political, did Pakistan have at that time as India had started to change the facts in Kashmir and no one in the world was, well, giving a damn. Should we perhaps have changed our priorities about Kashmir and looked at other problems.

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Naqvi saheb is totally out of his mind discounting Sajjad Haider's points. The fact of the matter is 65 war can never be claimed as a victory by any side (despite the massive propaganda). Ayub being the president and Musa being the C-in-C should have resisted the urge to go to war by the Pakistani FM. The fact that we did not achieve our aims in 1965 and were actually put on the defensive by the Indian offensive (which we did hold back, but not as the goal of war, by that time, we were trying to save our rears) tells one a lot about this elusive "victory".

Musa Khan, although a very decent human being, was a yes-man and for exactly this reason appointed the C-in-C. He rose from the ranks which speak to his hard working ethics, but he was not a leader who could say "no" when it needed to be said. But then, Musa Khan was the little fish, I am not sure why and how Ayub Khan saheb got carried away by Mr. Bhutto's prodding?

I agree with you regarding this Naqvi character. Keep in mind Sajjad 'Nosey' Haider led the famed strike on pathankot which still is one of the shining moments of the PAF. I think he knows a thing or two about the actual war from a first person perpective rather than reading propaganda.

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I know Air Marshal Asghar Khan has written several books on his political life and thoughts. Has he ever written any book on his airforce days? What has he got to say about this allegation of being fired by Ayub Khan?

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